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Theactionsofthe Federal Reserve System, as the
nation's central bank, have a on eco-
nomic activity and the level ofprices. The impactof
these actions, however, cannot be observed apart
from the effect of other influences such as fiscal
policy decisions. As a result, the Fed must rely
on intermediate measures such as the money supply
or interest rates to gauge the effectiveness of its
policy actions. To be useful as an intermediate tar-
get, such a measure should, first, be related to
economic activity (GNP) in a stable and predictable
manner, and second, be susceptible to Federal Re-
serve control.
Since the mid-1970s, the Federal Reserve has
used the money supply as its intermediate target by
setting-and striving to meet-annual growth rate
targets for several monetary aggregates, including
Ml, M2, M3 and a measure of bank credit. Ml
comprises currency, demand deposits, other inter-
est-bearing checkable deposits and travellers'
cheques. M2 includes Ml, savings deposits, smaIl
denomination time certificates, noninstitutional
money market mutual fund shares, overnight repur-
chase agreements andovernighteurodoIlardeposits
held by U.S. residents. M3 comprises M2, term
repurchase agreements, institutional money market
fund shares and large denomination certificates
ofdeposit.
Despite this wide array ofmeasures ofthe money
supply, the public and the Federal Reserve have, in
practice, tended to focus on the narrower aggre-
gates. These measures have the most stable and
predictable relationship to economic activity histor-
icaUy, and they are mostclosely underthecontrolof
the central bank. Recent changes in U.S. financial
markets, however, may be changing the nature of
that relationship, making the impact of monetary
policy decisions temporarily harderto gauge than in
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the past. The virtual revolution in cash management
techniques of the past decade has permitted busi-
nesses and households to transact a greater volume
of transactions with a given level of transaction
balances than was true previously. Innovations in-
volving the increased use ofautomation in bill col-
lection (such as automated lockboxes) and in funds
transfer (such as automatic investment of idle
funds) have increased the rate ofturnover oftrans-
action balances and reducedthe demandfor narrow-
ly defined money relative to income or spending.
Furthermore, the growing acceptance ofnew high-
yielding and highly liquid instruments, such as
money market mutual funds and retail repurchase
agreements, has profoundly affected the ways the
public chooses to hold its wealth and accommodate
its transaction needs. Likewise, regulatory and leg-
islative changes aIlowing depository institutions to
pay interest on transaction balances that are held in
ATS (automatic transfer from savings) and NOW
(negotiable order ofwithdrawal) accounts have led
to substantial shifts of funds into these interest-
bearing accounts from traditional demand and
savings deposits.
Changes in the public's demand for various types
offinancial instruments have altered the meaningof
the monetary aggregates, making observed growth
in these aggregates harder to interpret. The growth
in Ml, in particular, has slowed considerably over
the past few years; yet, with the proliferation of
higher-yielding substitutes for the traditional Ml-
type transaction instruments, slower observed
growth may not necessarily be associated with a
slowdown in the economy.
The Federal Reserve System has sought ways to
minimize the effects ofrecent innovationsandregu-
latory changes upon the meaning of the monetary
aggregates and theirrelationship to economic activ-
ity. One part ofthis effort has centered around the
redefinition ofthe monetary aggregates announced
in early 1980. By including ATS and NOW ac-counts in the narrow definition of money and by
acknowledging the potential transaction character-
istics ofmoney marketfunds andovernightRPs and
eurodollars, the redefined aggregates correspond
more closely than did the old measures to the new
ways in which the public has chosen to hold its
transaction balances and liquid assets. This redefi-
nition has helped to reduce the distortion in ob-
served growth rates caused by shifts offunds among
financial instruments which are now viewed as
close substitutes but which, for whatever reasons,
were formerly classified as components ofdifferent
aggregates.
The Federal Reserve has also come to place
greater emphasis in its policy deliberations on
broader aggregates whose growth rates and rela-
tionships to economic activity are affected less by
shifts of funds among financial instruments. As
recently as 1980, the most prominent measureofthe
money supply-then termed MI-A-included only
currency and demand deposits. Today, the policy
focus has shifted to MI-B-which includes ATS
and NOW accounts as well as traditional demand
deposits and currency-and, to acertain extent, to
M2. Reflecting this change of emphasis, MI-A is
now no longer published and MI-B has been re-
named Ml. In 1981 the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee (FOMC) appeared, at times, to give consid-
erable weight to M2 growth. Some Committee
members argued at that time thatat least someofthe
surprisingly sluggish growth of(shift-adjusted) Ml
may have been due to the public's ability to reduce
its holdings of traditional transaction balances by
Shifting funds to the higher-yielding substitutes
(such as money market funds) included in M2.'
The Federal Reserve System also has attempted
to cope with the problem of measuring and inter-
preting money growth by adjusting observed
growth rates (or growth-rate targets) ofthe aggre-
gates to account for distortions that are caused by
shifts offunds among financial instruments result-
ing from readily identified changes in law. The
Fed's treatment of the growth in other checkable
deposits that occurred after the nationwide intro-
duction of NOW accounts at the end of 1980 is an
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exampleofthis approach. Shiftsoffunds into NOW
accounts from sources other than demand deposits
"artificially" boosted Ml growth at that time.
To compensate, the Fed began using a "shift-
adjusted" measureofM1in its policydeliberations.
Although until now the Fed has used this approach
to accommodate specific regulatory changes, simi-
lar shift-adjustments to account for other types of
financial change may become possible and desir-
able in the future. For example, the explosive
growth of money market funds in 1981 may have
"artificially" reduced Ml growth, thus increasing
the desirability ofa shift-adjustment to account for
that distortion. Likewise, the growing acceptance
ofdeposit-sweeping arrangements, whereby excess
balances in transaction accounts are automatically
"swept" into money funds, may also distort future
Ml growth and encourage consideration ofa shift-
adjustment.
This paper analyzes the shift-adjustment tech-
nique, both as it has been used to compensatefor the
distorting effects of rapid NOW account growth
during a transition period and as it might be used to
compensate for the distorting effects ofchanges in
the demand for other financial instruments. The
first section presents the rationale for adjusting Ml
to compensate for growth in NOW balances. The
second section examines the alternative approach
of adjusting the growth rate target for Ml. Since
the shift-adjustment technique is essentially a
,'sources-and-uses" concept, the third section pro-
vides an interpretation ofthe technique from amon-
ey demandcontext. The fourth section describes the
methodology used to calculate the published mea-
sure ofshift-adjusted Ml, and the fifth section ana-
lyzes the sensitivity of that measure to alternative
assumptions about the sources of growth in NOW
balances. The sixth section examines the merits of
using the shift-adjustment technique to compensate
forotherchanges in financial markets, anddevelops
a shift-adjusted measure ofMl that would incorpo-
rate the impact ofgrowth in money market funds.
The paper concludes with a discussion ofpotential
uses and limitations of the shift-adjustment tech-
nique in the future.I. Rationale for Shift-Adjusted Measure
The nationwide introduction ofNOWaccounts at
the end of 1980 distorted the observed growth rates
of the narrow monetary aggregates, which were
identified then as Ml-A and Ml-B. (As noted ear-
lier, Ml-A is no longer published and MI-B has
been renamed Ml.) By causing funds to shift to
NOW accounts from both transaction and nontrans-
action accounts, this development altered the
growth rates ofMI-Aand MI-B relative to the rates
that would otherwise have prevailed. As a result,
the growth rates oftheFed'syardsticks-MI-A and
Ml-B-were distorted by these shifts offunds. Be-
cause the extent of the distortion was not directly
observable, analysts lost some ability to measure
the impactofmonetary policyon economic activity.
As early as July 1980, the FederalReserve acknowl-
edged this problem, when in his monetary policy
report to Congress Chairman Volcker stated that:
The introduction ofnegotiable order ofwith-
drawal (NOW) accounts on a nationwide ba-
sis in January will accelerate the shift from
regular demand deposits into interest-earning
transactions balances, thereby depressing
MI-A growth next year. On the other hand,
MI-B probably will be boosted somewhat
next year by shifts from savings deposits and
other interest-bearing assets into NOW ac-
counts. The range for MI-B thus may have to
accommodate a period ofabnormal growth as
the public adjusts to the availability ofa new
instrument. 2
The extent to which MI-B was boosted and MI-A
depressed depended on first, the rate ofgrowth in
NOW balances and second, the sources of that
growth. Had NOW balances grown only slightly,
the distortions in growth would likewise have been
minimal. However, the rapid growth in NOW bal-
ances that actually occurred during 1981, from
$28.1 billion to $77.0 billion, meant a distortion in
the growth ofone or both ofthe narrow (MI-A and
MI-B) aggregates from these shifts offunds.
Conceivably, this distortion could have occurred
in the growth rate ofonly one ofthe two aggregates
-Ml-A, ifthe growth in NOW balances had come
entirely from demand deposits, or Ml-B, if that
growth had comeentirely from savings deposits and
other non-Ml assets. In fact, however, NOW
growth affected both aggregates. MI-Agrowth was
affected to a greaterextent because NOWs have the
transaction features of checking accounts-plus
5\4 percent intereSL However, NOWs were gener-
ally offered in connection with high minimum-bal-
ance requirements and offeredalmost the same rates
of return as savings accounts, and thus distorted
Ml-B growth also by inducing depositors to com-
bine checking and savings funds to open accounts.
Faced with potential distortions in the MI-B
growth rate, then, the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee announced an annual growth target for that
aggregate which abstacted from any shifts offunds
related to the introduction of NOW accounts on a
nationwide basis. The target growth range was set,
in other words, as if NOW accounts had not been
introduced at the end of 1980. In order to evaluate
MI-B growth against its growth target, then, the
observed growth of this aggregate required an ad-
justment to account for shifts related to NOW
growth. The adjustment, in essence, involved sub-
tracting from observedgrowth thatproportionofthe
growth in NOW balances which carne from trans-
fers offunds from savings accounts and other non-
transaction accounts.
II. Adjustments to Growth Rate Targets
As an alternative to adjusting the actual growth
rate ofMl, the Federal Reserve could have adjusted
the growth rate target for that aggregate in such a
way that observed growth could then be compared
directly to the target. These two approaches are
equivalent, in theory. The Federal Reserve, in fact,
had employed this second approach earlier to ac-
count for shifts of funds that were caused by the
8
introduction of Automatic Transfer from Savings
(ATS) accounts. In 1979, following the late-1978
debut of ATS accounts, the FOMC chose to lower
the target range for old MI, thereby widening the
difference between the midpoints ofthe annual tar-
gets for old Ml and M2-01d Ml comprised only
currency and demand deposits, while old M2 added
small denomination time and savings deposits andother checkable deposits. By widening the spread
between the growth rate targets, the FOMC was
able to compensate for the divergence in the ob-
served growth rates caused by shifts offunds from
demand deposits (included in Ml) to ATS accounts
(included in the non-Ml component ofold M2).
Likewise, in 1980, the Federal Reserve adjusted
the growth rate targets ofthe aggregates to accom-
modate shifts of funds into ATS accounts. At the
beginning of the year, the FOMC set the spread
between the midpoints of the targets ranges for
Ml-A and Ml-B at 1/2 percentage point, on the
assumption that shifts into ATS accounts would
slow overthe course ofthe year. However, with the
passage ofthe Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act (March 1980), which
permanently authorized ATS accounts and autho-
rized NOW accounts on a nationwide basis as of
year-end, commercial banks began to promote ATS
accounts more vigorously in order to get a "head-
start" on the NOW account competition. (To the
depositor, ATS and NOW accounts are virtually
indistinguishable.) As a result, the growth of ATS
balances accelerated as depositors shifted funds
from checking and interest-earning assets. Hence,
MI-B grew more rapidly than it would have other-
wise, while Ml-A grew more slowly. In light of
these shifts, Chairman Volckerstated in the Board's
February 1981 Policy Report to Congress that the
1980 growth targets for MI-A and MI-B should
have been adjusted to take account of these shifts:
"If the FOMC's [target] ranges are adjusted for
current estimates of the actual impact of shifting
into ATS and NOW accounts, the [observed] in-
creases in both narrow aggregates are close to the
upper bounds ofthe FOMC's ranges for 1980."3
Although the two ways ofcompensating for dis-
tortions in aggregate growth are equivalent in theo-
ry, adjustments to the observed growth rates maybe
preferable in practice, since less information about
the nature ofthe shifts offunds is required a priori
than is needed for adjustments to the targets. Also,
given the potentially greater impact on money
growth rates anticipated from the nationwide intro-
ductionofNOWaccounts, the Feddecidedtoadjust
the observed growth rates in 1981. Raising the MI
growth rate target at a time when the Federal Re-
serve was anxious to demonstrate its commitmentto
a gradual reduction in money supply growth might
have confused the general public. Furthermore, it
might have been more confusingto change publicly
announced growth rate targets as new information
on NOW sources became available than to change
the shift-adjustment of the levels of the monetary
aggregates.
III. Interpretation ofShift-Adjustment
The theoretical concept of a shift-adjustment-
whether to the observed growth rate or to the target
growth rate-has never been particularly well-
defined in Federal Reserve publications. Ithas gen-
erally been described as a means of abstracting
from, or compensating for, shifts of funds which
temporarily produce an "abnormal" rate ofgrowth
in a given aggregate. But what is "abnormal?"
Abnormal growth is not merely any deviation from
an aggregate's trend rate ofgrowth, since that de-
viation may be due to changes in the levels of
interest rates orincome whichinfluence the demand
for money. Instead, abnormal growth is growth that
cannot be accounted for once adjustments are made
for such changes in income and interest rates. How,
then, should the shift-adjustment technique be in-
terpreted? Essentially, it has been used to quantify
shifts in the level ofthe moneydemand function that
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are caused by the introduction of new instruments
and otherlegislative and regulatory changes.
The shift-adjustment technique is based on an
analysis of the shifts of funds among financial in-
struments that apparently arise from shifts in the
money demand function-i.e., from shifts offunds
into (orout of) agiven monetary aggregate. Implicit
in this approach is the assumption that the introduc-
tion ofa new instrument (such as NOWs) does not
change the way the monetary aggregate responds to
changes in income growth or the level of interest
rates. Ofcourse, shifts offunds into a new instru-
ment frequently alter the composition ofthe aggre-
gate and, possibly, alter the income- and interest
elasticities ofthe demand for that aggregate as well
as the level of money demanded. To the extent,
then, that these shifts change elasticities, the use of
a shift-adjustment will not fully capture the changein the relation between the aggregate and the eco-
nomic variables of ultimate concern-income,
prices, employment, etc.
This inability to measure fully the nature of the
shift in money demand may not represent a serious
shortcoming of the shift-adjustment technique in
the short-run, however. Initially, while the public
rearranges its portfolio of financial assets III re-
sponse to the availability of a new instrument, the
effect on money growth of changes in elasticities
(the slope of the money demand curve) is likely to
be much less pronounced than the effect ofchanges
in the level ofmoney demanded (the interceptofthe
money demand curve). As a result, shift-adjusted
measures may be useful temporary measures of
money growth even if the income- and interest
elasticities of money demand have changed. The
Federal Reserve has, in fact, used shift-adjustments
as merely temporary yardsticks. The Fed stopped
calculating shift-adjusted MI, for example, when
the shifts of funds were apparently over. Once the
public has rearranged its portfolio, ofcourse, shift-
adjustments are no longer necessary. This is be-
cause either the level of measured money demand
has changed and the aggregate's long-term growth
rate has not been affected, or else the elasticities
have changed and the shift-adjustment is incapable
of capturing the change in the long-term money
growth rate. (In the latter case, the long-term
growth rate target must be changed to reflect the
new relationship between money growth and in-
come and interest rates.)
The shift-adjustment to MI that was associated
with the nationwide introduction ofNOW accounts
illustrates the way in which shift-adjustments at-
tempt to cope with shifts in the slope as well as in the
intercept of the money demand curve. Clearly, the
introduction of NOWs increased the demand for
MI, causing the level ofthe money demand curveto
shift outward. Whether that shift was also charac-
terized by changes in either the incorne- or interest-
elasticities ofmoney demand depended on the way
that both the suppliers and demanders ofNOW-ac-
count services responded to their availability. Prior
to the introduction of interest-bearing transaction
accounts, of course, depository institutions could
not pay explicit interest on transaction balances.
Although they were able to evade this restriction by
offering free services to their customers, the yield
on transaction balances tended to be low and unre-
sponsive to changes in market interest rates. By
allowing depository institutions to pay up to 51 ,4
percent explicit interest, then, NOWs (and ATS)
undoubtedly raised the (j,verage yield on transaction
Chart 1
Alternative Assumptions About NOW Accounts'










M~ = initial moneydemand curve
M~ = new money demand curve after NOWs
M~. = assumed newmoneydemand curve for shift-adjustment
10balances substantially.
A one-time upward adjustment in yield would
increase the demand for MI, but would not affect
the income- and interest-elasticities. As illustrated
in Panel A ofChart I, the money demand curve has
shifted to the right, parallel to the old demand
curve. In this case, a shift-adjustment to MI would
produce an MI measure that would, in effect, return
thedemand curve to its original position, as indicat-
edby the arrow. The Federal Reserve would then be
able to use the old relation between the MI aggre-
gate and income and interest rates to judge whether
its policies were appropriate.
The results are not so straightforward if NOW
accounts did, in fact, change the income- and inter-
est-elasticities of money demand. This situation
may have arisen for two reasons. First, the introduc-
tion ofNOW accounts changed the composition of
MI by raising the proportion ofhousehold deposits
contained in MI relative to the proportion ofbusi-
ness deposits. Since the demand for household
deposits may respond somewhat differently to








demand for business deposits, this change in com-
position could have changed the slope of the de-
mand for MI. Second, because depository institu-
tions are now permitted to pay up to 51,4 percent on
transaction balances, they have more flexibility
(and possibly more incentive) to vary the yield in
accordance with changes in market rates. Of
course, given current levels of market rates, most
institutions are offering the ceiling rate; however,
they are still able to vary the average yield (and have
done so on occasion) on NOWs by changing other
features such as minimum balance requirements.
The possibility that the yield on transaction bal-
ances now varies more than before with changes in
market rates may mean a decline in the elasticity of
the demand for money. Panel B ofChart I depicts
this new, steeper slope. Since the shift-adjustment
technique cannot measure this change in slope,
shift-adjusted MI will treat the new demand curve
as if it were parallel to the old curve at the new
equilibrium point. The lightest colored line and the
circle indicate that the shift-adjustment accurately
measures the impact ofmonetary policy at only one
point on the new demand curve.
Chart2




11To the extent that the introduction of NOW ac-
counts altered the income- and interest-elasticities
ofthe demand forMI, then, distortions in the mea-
surementofJ;TIoney growth could have arisen. How-
ever, the post-NOW rearrangement of the public's
portfolio of financial assets apparently happened
very rapidly, thereby temporarily swamping the ef-
fects of any changes in demand elasticities that
might also have occurred. Distortions in shift-
adjusted Ml, as a result, were probably minimal.
Problems with such distortions might have been
more serious, however, if the public's portfolio
adjustment had not occurred so rapidly and ifNOW
accounts had been allowed to yield higher and more
flexible rates-sincethis clearlywould havecaused
majorchanges in the income- orinterest-elasticities
of money demand. Similarly, distortions in shift-
adjusted measures are likely to be more pronounced
when we consider some ofthe other, higher-yield-
ing substitutes for traditional transaction accounts,
such as money market funds (Section VI).
The calculated NOW-account distortion in the
Ml growth rate was quite substantial during 1981,
particularly during the first four months ofthe year,
when the difference between the actual and shift-
adjusted measures widened by several billion dol-
lars eachconsecutivemonth. (SeeChart2 andTable
1). The spread widened at amuch slowerpace in the
latter half of the year, however, which suggests
a weakening of the shifts of funds creating such
a divergence.
As noted earlier, the calculation ofshift-adjusted
MI involves a subtraction from the observed Ml
level ofthe increment in ATS and NOW balances,
or "othercheckable deposits" (OCD), which orig-
inally came from accounts not included in Ml.
Though conceptually simple, the arithmetic in-
volved in the Federal Reserve's calculationofshift-
adjusted Ml was actually quite complicated be-
cause of seasonal adjustment factors. The basic
calculationcanbe described somewhatmore simply
(Table 2). As a first step, the Fedestimates the level
IV. Calculation ofShift-Adjusted M1
to which OCD balances would have grown assum-
ing normal, trend growth in such accounts, but
without the nationwide introduction ofNOWs. Ac-
cording to these estimates, the trend growth rate
was $200 million per month during the first halfof
1981 and $300 million permonth in the latterhalfof
the year. Growth in NOW balances in the North-
east, where NOWs hadbeen available priorto 1981,
would be included in this trend since, presumably,
such growth was not affected by the change in the
law. Likewise, some ofthe growth in ATS balances
was included in trend growth since ATS accounts
had been introduced by commercial banks in 1978.
(Still, the ATS trend was harder to measure because
banks began promoting such accounts more aggres-
sively in late 1980 and early 1981 as an alternative to
the newly authorized NOW accounts.)
The above-trend growth in OCD-the growth
attributable to the introduction of NOWs-then
could be obtained by subtracting the trend level
from the observed growth of OCD. The amount of
growth in OCD balances that can be attributed to
Table 1




















































































2) Less trend levelofOCD
3) Yields above-trend growth in OCD (cumulative)
4) Less previous month's above-trend level
5) Yields current month's above-trend growth
6)Timesfraction ofgrowthassociatedwith shifts from nontransaction sources
7) Yields OCD from nontransaction sources
8) Cumulative nontransactionOCD
9) Observed level ofMI
10) Less cumulative nontransaction OCD (from line 8)
II) Yields shift-adjusted MI
Figures in this table may not agree precisely with lable I figures, due to slight differences in the calculation ofseasonally adjusted totals.
shifts of funds from savings and other non-MI de-
posits, then, is obtained by multiplying the above-
trend growth in OCD by the fraction ofthat growth
assumed to come from nontransaction sources-
estimated at .225 during January and .275 in sub-
sequent months. Shift-adjusted MI is obtained,
finally, by subtracting from observed MI the cumu-
come from
nontransaction sources. shift-ad-
justed MI could be calculated by adding its indi-
vidual components: currency, demand deposits,
travellers' cheques, cumulative trend OCD and
cumulative OCD estimated to have come from
demand delJOsits.
V.lmportanceofAssumptions
These calculations reveal that the magnitude of
the shift-adjustment depends on several factors-
the growth in OCD balances outstanding, the as-
sumed trend growth in those balances, the propor-
tion ofthe above-trend growth attributable to shifts
from non-Ml sources and, finally, the duration of
the stock adjustment process. Only one factor-the
overall growth in OCD balances-actually can be
observed, and the other three factors can only be
estimated from indirect evidence. As a result, the
shift-adjusted measure of MI could be subject to
error, possibly providing the FOMC with mislead-
about the ofits
Estimates ofthe trend growth in ATS/NOW
ances and the proportion
associated with shifts from and other non-
transaction sources were based on econometric evi-
dence and on surveys ofdepository institutions and
households. The econometric evidence came from
several which .•related the !llcmtlhly
changes in NOW balances at individual banks to
reported changes in other deposit categories. The
underlying hypothesis was that, with the diversion
of funds to NOWs from other deposit categories
(either within each institution or intraregionaHy),
institutions with substantial growth in NOW bal-
ances would a smaller increase in other de-
positcategories than would institutions with smaller
NOW increases. In each regression, the change in
NOWbalances was the independent variable, while
the changes in the other deposit
demand, personal savings, nonpersonal savings,
personal time and nonpersonal time deposits-
were each treated in separate as depen-
dent variables. Each equation took the form:
t:::.DC/Z = -!3,(t:::.N/Z)+!32+u, where
t:::.DC = in balance of each
specific deposit category
t:::.N = inNOW balances;
Z
!32 =constant representing effects of "other
factors''; and
u =errorterm.
statistica:Hy significaJlll coefficienton the NOW
account variable in each equation could be inter-
preted loosely as the proportion of NOW growth
coming from each deposit However, only
the regressions for demand deposits and personal
13from various types ofassets.
Like the regression results, these surveys had a
number of weaknesses. The first was simply the
quality ofthe responses, particularly from the banks
-manyofthe respondents may have provided only
rough estimates. Furthermore, the original source
of each NOW deposit may not have been the ac-
count from which funds were actually transferred,
because this transaction would representonlyone in
a chain of related portfolio-balance transactions.
And the surveys, by addressing only the new ac-
counts, would not have captured any shifts to exist-
ing accounts. However, the agreementbetweensur-
vey and regression results lends added credence to
the estimates.
Nonetheless, small errors in estimating the
sources ofNOW account growth couldhave signifi-
cantly distorted the shift-adjusted measure of MI.
Table 3 shows the sensitivity of this measure to
alternative assumptions about the proportion of
NOW growth attributable to one-time shifts from
savings.
The growth rate ofthe shift-adjusted measure of
Ml varies widely, depending on the estimate ofthe
proportion ofOCD growth associated with shifts of
funds from savings and other non-transaction ac-
counts. If 17 percent of the above-trend growth in
OCD balances had come from nontransaction
sources, instead of 27.5 percent as assumed, "ef-
fective" Ml in 1981 would have grown 4.2 percent
instead of 3.2 percent-in the lower half of the
target range instead ofbelow the lowerbound ofthe
range. (See Chart 3). The disparity in the estimated
effective growth rates was even larger during the
early months ofthe yearbecauseofthe rapidgrowth
in OCD balances at that time.
savings deposits yielded statistically significant
results-approximately80 percentofNOWgrowth
in January outside of the Northeast came from
demand deposits, while nearly 20 percent of that
growthcame from savings deposits (adjustedfor the
relative market sharesofbanks and savings and loan
associations).
This approach has some advantages for estimat-
ing the proportion of NOW growth attributable to
shifts from savings. By using a cross section of
institutions and a cross section ofregions, we need
not specifically include general influences on de-
posit levels (such as interest rates and economic
activity) in the regressions, since most of those
influences presumably do not vary across institu-
tions. However, to the extent that any omitted vari-
ables are correlated with specific variables, the
regression results may be biased. For example, in-
stitutions that report large changes in demand and
NOW balances may also have more "sophisti-
cated" depositors who behave differently from de-
positors in general. These depositors are likely to
shift checking balances into NOWs and at the same
time continue to shift passbook savings balances
into higher-yielding instruments. Because these
shifts of savings will appear to be correlated with
NOW growth, the savings deposit regression will
tend to overstate the NOWeffect.
In addition to regression data, the Federal Re-
serve obtained estimates of the sources of NOW
growth from a number of surveys of depository
institutions and households. Depository institutions
were asked to provide dataonthe percentages ofthe
total inflows to their new NOW accounts that came
from their own checking and other types of ac-
counts. Likewise, consumers were asked what pro-
portions of their NOW balances were transferred
Table 3
Shift-Adjusted M1 Under Alternative Shift Assumptions
(Billions of Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted)
6.6% $419.4 5.5% $440.9 6.1%
-0.6 415.2 -0.6 433.1 4.2
-3.2 413.4 -3.2 428.7 3.2



















*Growth since December 1980 at simple annual rate
14Another source of possible distortion is the as-
sumption regarding the duration ofthe stock adjust-
ment process. Instead ofextending throughout 1981
as assumed, the process may have been substantial-
ly over by June-as Table 1 possibly suggests.
Thus, ifthe Fed had stopped adjusting M1 at the end
of May, the calculated growth rate for the full year
would have been nearly 4 percent, instead of 3.2
percent.
Given the sensitivity of the shift-adjusted mea-
sure of MI to alternative assumptions about the
sources of OCD growth and the duration of the
stock adjustment process, the success ofthe Federal
Reserve's efforts to obtain a truly reliable measure
of effective money growth cannot be determined
with any degree of precision. Depending on the
assumptions one uses in calculating shift-adjusted
M1, monetary policy in 1981 could be viewed as
having been either moderately expansionary or
fairly contractionary. Clearly, then, the Fed's mea-
surement problems did not disappear once shift-
adjusted M1 had been calculated.
VI. Adjustments for Other Shifts
Although the Fed has used shift-adjustments pri-
marily to account for shifts offunds engendered by
regulatory and legislative changes such as the intro-
duction ofATS accounts (1978) and NOW accounts
(late 1980), the rationale for using a shift-adjusted
measure of money growth applies equally well to
shifts of funds that are related to other types of
financial change. In fact, shift-adjustments for reg-
ulatorychanges probably addressjustasmall partof
the whole money measurement problem. After all,
it is the sweeping changes in financial markets that
create the pressure for legislative and regulatory
remedies. Forexample, the pressure for payment of
interestontransaction balances and for deregulation
of deposit rate ceilings generally would be less
pronounced iffinancial markets were unable to of-
fer depositors nondeposit alternatives.
Money market mutual funds, deposit-sweeping
arrangements, retail repurchase agreements, and
loophole accounts-all changes occurring largely
Chart3
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15outside the regulatory framework-may have con-
tributed significantly to the current problem of in-
terpreting money growth. Money market mutual
funds (MMFs), which are included in the M2 aggre-
gate, are technically open-end short-term invest-
ment pools. They invest in a variety ofhighly liquid
money market instruments such as Treasury bills,
large negotiable certificatesofdeposit andcommer-
cial paper. However, minimum initial investment
requirements are generally low ($1,000 to $2,500),
and shareholders may write checks against their
accounts transfer funds to third
wire, so that MMFs may be viewedas partial substi-
tutes for the transaction accounts included in MI.
Deposit-sweeping arrangements also may create
money measurement problems, since they permit
depositors to keep their transaction account bal-
ances to a minimum, while automatically transfer-
ring idle funds to ahighly liquid and higheryielding
instrument (usually MMFs). _
With retail repurchase agreements and loophole
accounts, banks and thrift institutions have created
alternatives to traditional transaction deposits as
well. Retail repurchase agreements (RPs) are essen-
tially short-term investments in denominations of
less than $1OO,OOO-minimum investment require-
ments are usually in the $1,000 to $2,500 range-
with maturities as short as one day or as long as 89
days. In order to compete with MMFs, banks and
savings and loan associations frequently offerretail
RPs in connection with a checking or NOW ac-
count, permitting the depositor to order transfers of
funds between the two accounts by telephone.
Loophole accounts also permit depositors to earn
market interest rates on funds that might otherwise
have been held in a transaction account. They offer
a line ofcredit which can be drawn on by check, in
connection with instruments such as the six-month
money market and thus grant delJositolrs
access to funds before the stated maturity date.
The current proliferation of high-yielding short-
term instruments with low minimum investment
requirements may be reducing the demand for Ml-
type balances. In the past, small savers did not have
many alternatives to low-yielding accounts, even
periods of high interest rates, and thus had
little incentive to reduce holdings of Ml-type bal-
ances. Now, however, they do have such an incen-
tive. First, the public may be able to use these new
instruments-MMFs and loophole accounts espe-
cially-as substitutes for demand deposits and
othercheckable deposits. Second, these new instru-
ments yield market rates far in excess of ATS and
NOW rates, and thus induce depositors to limittheir
Chart 5
Yield Spread and Money Markel Fund Changes
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Year-End level Annual Growth
Shift Assumption ofM1" (adjusted) Rate Over1981
$ 0 $428.7 3.2%
12 440.7 6.0
18 446.7 7.5
*This measure of M1 also incorporates the Federal Reserve
estimate ofthe NOW shift-adjustmenl.
holdings of all types of transaction balances. As a
result, Ml growth may give misleading policy sig-
nals, particularly during the stock adjustment
period when the growth in these new instruments is
very rapid. Shift-adjustments to compensate for
these shifts outofMl thus may be appropriate.
The phenomenal growth in money market funds
(from $75.8 billion to $184.5 billion in 1981) in
particularmay reflect this adjustment in the public's
stock ofassets. Ofcourse, one could argue that this
growth was only a normal response to high interest
rates, which induced the to shift funds into of this growth may have come from stocks of
MMFs (as one ofseveral options) from lower-yield- demand and other transaction balances, causing
ing assets. The 1980-81 experience does not sup- observed Ml to grow more slowly (after the NOW-
port this argument, however. Although interest-rate account adjustment) than if MMFs had not been
patterns were similar in both years, MMF balances available. In fact, according to one source, MMFs
grew much more rapidly in 1981 than in 1980. reduced Ml demand by more than $12 billion by
(Chart 4). Furthermore, the response to changes in September 1981.
4 Therefore, just as the Fed adjust-
the spread between MMF yields and the six-month ed Ml growth downward to account for NOW-
T-bill rate was much more dramatic in 1981 than in induced shifts offunds from interest-earning assets,
1980 (Chart 5). so it should have made an upward adjustment to
Instead, some sortofstockadjustment apparently account for MMF-induced shifts of funds out of
increasedthe MMFgrowth rate substantially. Some MI.
Chart 6
M1 Observed and Adjusted for MMF Shifts
Shift-adjusted ($18 billion MMF shift)
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17Various measures of MI can be calculated,
depending on whatever assumption is made about
the percentage of noninstitutional MMFs (coming
from a reduction in Ml-type balances (see Table 4).
Incidentally, we exclude institution-onlyMMFs be-
cause such funds are generally regarded as substi-
tutes for direct money-market investments. Forthis
reason, institution-only MMFs are included only in
M3, while other MMFs are included in M2. Share-
holders of institution-only funds generally have
otheroptions forearningmarketrates on transaction
balances, and these funds thus may not attract bal-
ances held for transaction purposes. Noninstitu-
tional MMFs, by contrast, tend to be close substi-
tutes for small-denomination deposit instruments
and, because of the lack of options their share-
holders have for earning market rates, such MMFs
are more likely to attract demand and other trans-
action balances.
With a $12-billion reduction in Ml-type balances
resulting from MMF growth, the adjusted Ml mea-
sure would have grown at a6.0-percent annual rate,
even after the NOW shift adjustment. But the $12-
billion shift assumption referred only to the first
nine months of 1981, and moreover, ,simulation
results showed the MMF impact increasing steadily
over that period. 5 Therefore, we couldassume upto
an $18 billion shift from transaction accounts into
MMFs. In that case, shift-adjusted Ml would have
grown at a 7.5 percent rate-more than the 6. 1-
percent growth in observed M1, offsetting the
downward NOW adjustment (see Chart6). Relative
to its target range, then, MI growth may actually
have been somewhat expansionary in 1981. How-
ever, this result seems contrary to the sluggish eco-
nomic growth observed in 1981. Furthermore, this
apparent inconsistency illustrates the difficulties
inherent in measuring demand shifts when the in-
strument involved, unlike a NOW account, pays
market interest rates.
VII. Conclusion
We have not seen the last of the sweeping
changes recently taking place in the U.S. financial
system. Money market funds continue to grow
rapidly. Increasing numbers ofbrokerage firms and
depository institutions are announcing deposit-
sweeping services, while larger numbers of banks
and thrift institutions are offering retail repurchase
agreements and loophole accounts. The pressure to
deregulate deposit interest rates continues to mount.
Furthermore, the Depository Institutions Deregula-
tion Committee (DIDC) has created a new market
rate 91-day account and is currently considering the
creation of other, more liquid accounts to permit
depository institutions to compete more effectively
withMMFs.
Thus, observed Ml growth may continue to give
somewhat misleading pplicy signals. To the extent
that distortions in Ml growth can be traced spe-
cifically to the growth in certain financial instru-
ments, shift-adjustments may be useful. Many of
these changes, however, cannot be quantified with
even the same degree of certainty as the NOW-
account shift. We have insufficient data to make
shift-adjustments for certain innovations, such as
18
deposit-sweeping arrangements. Furthermore,
many of these new instruments pay market rates
(unlike NOW accounts), so that shifts of funds
become harder to classify, either as shifts in the
demand for money or as changes in the quantity of
money demanded due to interest rate changes. As a
result, the ability of shift-adjustments to compen-
sate for these changes and to reduce uncertainty
about the effective growth rate of money may be
somewhat limited, compared to what could be
achieved with the NOW shift-adjustment.
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